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TIME FOR THE ECJ TO BECOME A
SUPRANATIONAL COURT?
During the last few years we have had much discussion
on reforming the institutional framework of the European
Union in order to enable it to cope effectively with a
Community of 25 states. Most of the debate has centred on
the legislative or decision-making bodies. The main
unresolved issues are the membership size of the European
Commission and the number of votes allocated to each
Member State’s representative in the EU Council.
As far as the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (“ECJ”) is concerned, the most significant
reform took place in 1988 with the establishment of the
Court of First Instance (“CFI”). This structural reform
and more recent reforms have been undertaken mainly as
a response to an increase in its workload. There is however
no significant debate on the nature and size of the ECJ.
This is a court which is primarily concerned with
“constitutional” and interpretation issues that shape the
Community’s legal order as a separate and distinct legal
order from national and international legal orders.
Although in Van Gend en Loos (1963) the ECJ held that
the EC Treaty created “its own legal system” different from
national and international law, ECJ judges continue to be
appointed in a manner more common to appointments to
international courts. The Community legal order, being
separate from the international legal order, should have a
supranationally appointed court. Is it not about time that
consideration is given to the size of the ECJ (as opposed to
the CFI, or any Panels that may be appointed under Article
225a EC Treaty) and the manner in which ECJ judges are
appointed?
Article 221 EC Treaty states that “The Court of Justice
shall consist of one judge per Member State” and Article
223 provides for the members of the Court to be
appointed by “common accord of the governments of the
Member States”. In practice, each Member State appoints
its own judge. The mechanism for choosing the national
judge is not uniform and left entirely in the hands of each
Member State. Although under Article 223 EC Treaty, the
person chosen must “possess the qualifications required
for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their
respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognised
competence,” they do not have to have any knowledge or
expertise in Community law nor are they required to be
fluent in French (the language of deliberation) or English
(the second language in most Member States).
The omission of a requirement for proven knowledge of
the legal order under which the appointed judges are going
to serve is understandable in the 1950s, but surely not
acceptable now when a considerable body of legal
principles and concepts have been developed by the court
to underpin this novel legal order. Similarly, the
requirement that a consensus judgment is reached at the
end of deliberations that are secret and undertaken
primarily in French (no interpreters are present), would
suggest that linguistic skills, one of the most important
tools in the art of persuasive argument, would be an
essential qualification.
Of course such radical reform will require a
“Convention” of expert judges, practitioners, academics
and representatives of Governments to identify the
problems that may arise and to ensure that appropriate
solutions are found. It is absolutely fundamental that any
reform should not jeopardise the general acceptance of the
ECJ’s rulings into the national legal order of the Member
States. Such a Convention should at the very least propose
a maximum number of judges, agree a list of conditions
and minimum qualifications of eligibility for appointment,
and devise an independent Appointments Commission to
appoint the judges.
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